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www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmOn March 5,  1990,  the C.D. Howe Institute sponsored a workshop to discuss 
research on the Bank of Canada's monetary policy goal of zero inflation.  The 
discussion was organized around papers published in Zero Inflation:  The Goal 
of Price Stability,  edited by Richard Lipsey and published in March 1990 by 
the C.D. Howe Institute in Toronto.  In the first chapter,  Lipsey describes 
the zero inflation policy of the Bank of Canada and outlines the main issues 
examined in the other papers, written by Douglas Purvis, Peter Howitt,  Pierre 
Fortin,  and David Laidler. 
In general, these papers applaud the Bank's commitment to an explicit and 
low inflation target,  but none was strongly in favor of zero as the particular 
target rate.  The most compelling argument against zero was the implication 
from conventional Keynesian macroeconomic theory that getting to zero would 
involve a potentially large one-time  loss of output.  Most other participants 
at the workshop were even more reluctant to support the Bank's  zero inflation 
policy than were the contributors to the Lipsey volume. 
This paper represents a dissenting opinion prepared at the invitation of 
the C.D. Howe Institute.  I am grateful to Thomas E. Kierans,  president of the 
Institute,  and to Robert C. York, senior policy analyst,  for giving me the 
opportunity to participate in this workshop. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm"I  shot an error into the air, 
it's  still going . .  . everywhere." 
Lazarus Long, in  Robert Heinlein's Expanded Universe 
I.  Introduction 
The papers in Lipsey (1990) support price stability in general,  but give 
only qualified support to the zero inflation policy adopted by the Bank of 
Canada.  Although many details of the Bank's  zero inflation policy are not 
clearly specified, I  believe that the benefits of switching to a regime of 
price stability can easily exceed the costs of getting there,  especially if 
the transition is clearly perceived and fully credible. 
"Zero inflation" is a phrase that attracts much attention.  Some 
confusion  arises because the operational meaning of the phrase depends on 
whether authorities are trying to target ex ante expectations or the ex post 
realization of inflation.  Suppose that,  each month,  monetary policy were set 
so that the expected inflation rate was equal to zero.  Using this 
definition, the price level would have no anchor--it  would drift about in 
response to real shocks and control errors because the central bank would not 
be responsible for reversing past deviations from zero. On the other hand, if 
policy is conducted to achieve zero inflation (over a given time horizon), 
then there could be short periods of rising and falling prices,  but the 
inflation rate would average to zero over the long term.  Using this 
definition,  the zero inflation  policy is equivalent to a price level target. 
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quantity of money undertaken in order to keep the value of money stable.  The 
idea of the value of money is unique:  No single market determines it. 
Rather, its value is determined by the things it will buy in millions of 
transactions occurring in  many markets.  Because the value of money cannot  be 
easily or precisely measured, a central bank has considerable flexibility in 
conducting monetary policy.  The disadvantage of this uncertainty is that the 
bank can never know positively how a particular policy action will affect the 
price level. 
This uncertainty is also reflected in how the price level is measured. 
Any particular price index will always contain some variation because of 
measurement error.  As Pierre Fortin clearly explains,  many conceptual and 
practical problems interfere  with the measurement of a true price index.  1 
All of the factors affecting supplies and demands in a complex market economy 
cause relative price changes that will induce some error in reported price 
indexes. 
But what does this mean for policy?  All measuring devices contain some 
error.  What is relevant is that the measurement error be small relative to 
economically important changes in the index.  Under a zero inflation policy, 
citizens should always expect that what goes up must come down and therefore 
recognize that variation in the aggregate price level should not affect 
economic decisionmaking. 
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Although the idea of a price level target seems radical today,  60 to 100 
years ago the concept was very popular among economists.  Historically, 
economists have always strongly supported a stable monetary standard.  Early 
standards were based on precious metals:  The first advocates of stable money 
supported fixing the value of money in terms of a fixed weight and fineness in 
the metal used to make coins.  Later,  as foreign trade became more important, 
many supporters urged fixing the value of money relative to a foreign currency 
that was based on a precious metal standard. 
The most important monetary policy issue during the early part of this 
century was the debate between those who wanted a gold standard and those who 
believed that changes in the relative price of gold caused financial panics 
and severe economic fluctuations. In  a 1934 classic,  Stable Money:  A History 
of the Movement, Irving Fisher traces the evolution of the idea of a monetary 
standard based on a price index.  Therein  he lists an impressive number of 
economists and legislators from around the world who advocated a monetary 
system that would stabilize a price index,  and drawing just from the 1800s, 
he describes 28 of their specific proposals.  2 
Economists' support for a monetary system that would stabilize a price 
index of consumer goods continued to grow during the early 1900s.  But despite 
this widespread support,  I could find only one example of a central bank 
actually adopting a price index target as a monetary policy goal.  In late 
September of 1931,  the Swedish government and the Riksbank left the gold 
standard and announced that they would use all means available to stabilize 
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that enabled the construction of a consumer price index (CPI) on a weekly 
basis.  The Riksbank's enthusiasm for adhering to the CPI target was tempered 
by its desire to fix the Swedish krona  vis-a-vis  the British pound. 
Nevertheless,  between December 1931 and the end of 1936, the CPI fluctuated 
only within 3 points of 100. 
This example makes clear that targeting the CPI would be a feasible 
policy, even in a small open economy.  However,  this evidence also raises the 
question of why modern economists have abandoned the goal of a stable monetary 
standard  . 
111.  Whv  is There so Little Support for Zero Inflation Policges? 
< 
Prior to World War 11,  there was widespread support among economists for 
a constant price level target;  however,  much of that support has disappeared. 
There are at least three plausible explanations of why support for zero 
inflation  policies is limited. 
First, in the post-World  War I1 environment,  relatively stable prices 
relieved the earlier pressure to adopt a price level target.  The stable money 
movement had been driven  by the experience of wide price variability under the 
gold standard.  The dollar-gold  standard associated with the Bretton Woods 
agreement seemed to solve one of the major problems of the pre-World  War I 
gold standard.  Even though the agreement proved to be unstable, the price 
experience was not volatile enough to generate widespread interest in  monetary 
reforms until the 1970s,  when the monetarist movement picked up the crusade 
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prescription, there seems to be renewed interest in price level targeting. 
Second,  nonmonetary models have dominated the frontier in macroeconomic 
research for almost two decades.  These microf  oundation models usually 
exclude the important reasons for having money.  Because the quantity of money 
does not play an important role,  following an inefficient monetary policy does 
little damage to these model economies.  To capture an important role for 
money, some sort of friction affecting trades in decentralized markets must 
occur. 
If one recognizes that the existence of money is inextricably tied to the 
functioning of market economies, then it is easy to see why disrupting the 
efficiency of the monetary system can cause great harm.  Peter Howitt 
recognizes this issue and notes that if inflation reduces market efficiency, 
then one ought to observe a negative correlation  between measures of factor 
productivity and inflation.  He cites evidence presented by Jarrett and 
Selody (1982) that inflationary policies have been associated with significant 
reductions in productivity growth in the Canadian economy.  The welfare 
implications of this result are overwhelming--so  much so that most people are 
incredulous.  (Note that Howitt gave little weight to this evidence in  his 
final cost-benefit  analysis.) 
The third and, I  think, the most important reason why there is so little 
support for zero inflation is because the conventional  macroeconomic model 
suggests that policymakers must slow real growth and cause unemployment in 
order to reduce inflation.  Conversely, this framework also suggests that 
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the inflation rate.  Although this paradigm is being challenged by economists 
at the frontier of macroeconomic research, it is the model familiar to most 
policy advisors and practicing macroeconomists. 
Douglas D. Purvis describes the monetary policy implications resulting 
from this standard framework.  Because these basic premises are so 
important to the argument against zero inflation,  we should take a closer look 
at their logical and empirical support.  Let us consider what Purvis calls 
"some core truths about monetary policy." 
Monetary policy has strong effects on the economy:  Too much money stimulates 
the economy and too little restricts it. 
This "core truth" has gained wide acceptance because raw statistical 
correlations show that money and real output are positively correlated; 
however,  intense debate surrounds this statement in academic circles.  The 
relevant question is whether moderate changes in money growth engineered by a 
discretionary money supply policy can enhance real growth. 
Statistical evidence is ambiguous because central banks actively 
accommodate money demand.  While economic decisionmakers try to follow 
countercyclical policies, their automatic response is usually to follow the 
economy upward in an expansion (with faster money growth) and downward in a 
recession (with slower money growth).  This behavior is most easily seen in 
the way central banks accommodate seasonal fluctuations.  An induced response 
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inertia combined with the use of money market interest rates as policy guides. 
By smoothing nominal interest rates,  central banks tend automatically to 
accommodate the demand for money, including the demand for money induced by 
changes in economic activity. 
To know  whether this first "core truth" is well founded in the evidence, 
money supply and money demand shocks must be identifiable;  however,  no one has 
successfully sorted out these factors in the post-World  War I1 data. 
The  immediate  effects of monetary policy are on  asset markets-interest  rates, 
exchange  rates, and stock prices. 
In each of these cases,  there is frequent trading and frequent posting of 
prices.  Yet we know that, even in these markets,  there is a form of price 
stickiness.  Consider the New York bond trader who makes a morning deal to buy 
$50 million in Treasury securities at a fixed price.  The deal will not be 
consummated until late in the day.  Meanwhile,  prices will change.  When the 
bonds are delivered,  the transaction will include a wealth transfer due solely 
to price changes that occurred during the day.  How is this wealth transfer 
any different from the wealth loss a worker suffers when inflation rises 
unexpectedly after a labor contract has been signed?  Just because markets 
clear only infrequently does not mean that prices are fixed or that new 
contracts will be made at old prices.  The next time the market clears 
(whether a financial, labor,  or goods market),  prices should be expected to 
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The  effects of monetary policy on  real variables such  as gross  domestic 
product  (GDP)  and  employment  occur with a lag that can be  long and  variable 
-the  peak  effect can  often occur  after a period  of two years  or more. 
"Long and variable" means that the relationship is unidentifiable.  If 
one believes that money supply actions have a positive effect on real ouiput, 
then he or she must also believe that the effect is long and variable, because 
there is little evidence of a systematic relationship. 
After an  extended  period-say,  five years  or more--the  effects  of monetary 
policy fall exclusively on  the price  level. 
I 




!  Irving Fisher (1918,  page 5)  in the early part of this century indicated that 
I 
i 
the lag from money to prices was less than three months. 
This is certainly conventional  wisdom.  However,  there are some good 
It  was in  August, 1915,  that the quantity of money in the 
United States began its rapid increase.  One month later 
prices began to shoot upward,  keeping almost exact pace 
with the quantity of money.  In  February, 1916,  money 
suddenly stopped increasing,  and two and a half months 
later prices stopped likewise.  Similar striking 
correspondences  have continued to occur with an average 
lag between the money cause and the price effect of about 
one and three-quarters  months. 
reasons to think that a credible change in monetary policy would affect prices 
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contemporary observers.  A recent econometric study using data from 1894 to 
1909 confirms Fisher's conclusion about the length of the lag. 
Event analysis of panic episodes,  ARMA 
representations  of gold flows,  and macroeconomic 
simulation  models of international adjustment  using 
monthly data all indicate that adjustment to 
transaction-balance  shocks was essentially complete 
within three months. 
Our results confirm the responsiveness of prices in 
the short run.  In  particular,  prices did not lag related 
movements in output. 
Calomiris and Hubbard 
(1989),  pages 430 and 431 
Although this evidence pertains to century-old  data, there is no reason 
to think that markets are less efficient today.  On the contrary,  advances in 
information and communication  technologies suggest that the relevant lags 
should be even shorter today.  I  think that a long lag is measured incorrectly 
today for at least two reasons.  First,  monetary authorities often seem to 
behave as if their goal is to ensure that no econometrician will ever identify 
an independent  money supply shock.  If money supply shocks are small relative 
to real shocks, then the real shocks that affect output are also important 
sources of short-term  variation in the price level.  The estimated lag from 
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money, prices,  and output over various horizons. 
The second reason for the estimation of a long lag is that we,  as 
econometricians (or chartists),  look backward while economic agents look 
forward.  If the past behavior of monetary authorities is an accurate 
predictor of future behavior, then the econometrician will forecast well when 
using models with long lags,  but the measured lags will have little 
connection  with the structural mechanisms linking money to the real economy. 
Estimated models will greatly overstate the output costs of reducing inflation 
via a credible change in monetary policy. 
In  order to lower  interest rates in the medium  term,  the central  bank  has  to 
raise them  in the short  term. 
A distinction should be made between a change in the policy stance within 
a given regime and a change in regime.  This statement seems to be a 
reasonable description of the dynamic relationship expected within the current 
discretionary regimes of both the United States and Canada.  Under current 
macro wisdom, the central bank has an incentive to mislead the public about 
its true inflation goal.  If people expect inflation to be low,  but the 
central  bank delivers high inflation,  then conventional wisdom predicts an 
economic boom.  Given this perverse incentive structure, it would take a 
longer period of higher interest rates to reduce inflation than would be the 
case if a credible zero inflation policy were introduced. 
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and on the credibility of the monetary authority. 
I agree completely.  The reason a transition to zero inflation would be 
costly is that people would not expect the policy change to succeed and would 
hedge against the day it was abandoned.  One important problem that needs to 
be considered in a transition to a credible zero inflation  policy is the fixed 
interest rate on existing contracts.  Whether the Bank of Canada's 
disinflation  policy will cause a recession depends very much on  whether the 
policy is credible and how quickly zero is achieved relative to the maturity 
structure of outstanding debt.  As noted by Richard Lipsey (1990) in  his 
introduction,  the chance that the policy will be abandoned is a major source 
of the cost of the policy.  Presumably,  the Canadian government could reduce 
these costs  by enacting legislation that would institutionalize  the goal of 
price stability.  7 
Although the relevance of conventional  macroeconomic wisdom can  be 
debated, it should be noted that,  even if the conventional  wisdom were true, 
unexpected inflation is costly.  The cost of disinflation lies in the 
unexpected nature of the policy.  If the policy regime is changed, there will 
be a one-time  cost to pay.  If the regime is not changed, then there will be 
repeated episodes of unexpected fluctuations in the price level,  resulting in 
ongoing  welfare losses that will almost surely overwhelm the one-time  costs of 
switching to a zero inflation regime. 
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Pierre Fortin wrote that the cardinal economic objective of government 
should be to improve the standard of living of its people.  This seems clear. 
The role of the central bank is to foster a monetary system that creates the 
best environment for achieving the highest standard of living. 
In my judgment,  the papers presented in Lipsey (1990) understate the 
costs of inflation and overstate existing knowledge about the costs of 
eliminating inflation.  The standard macroeconomic model was not designed to 
do welfare analysis.  Not only is it difficult to interpret the welfare 
implications of macroeconomic predictions,  but the conventional macroeconomic 
framework is designed to analyze monetary policy actions within a given 
regime,  not to evaluate a change in regimes. 
The first element of my argument in support of zero inflation is that 
rules matter.  Economics is a way of thinking about how society's  rules can be 
shaped to promote individual freedom and high living standards.  By protecting 
the civil liberties and property rights of individuals, we promote economic 
efficiency and raise the average standard of living.  Wherever possible, the 
role of government should be to establish the rules,  not to  interfere with the 
operation of the system within those rules.  In  making recommendations about 
short-run  policy actions, economists must be careful not to change 
inadvertently the nature of the rules governing the economy. 
The extreme alternative to this model of a free-market  economy based on 
rules is the centrally run economy.  But all free-market  economies are 
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mixtures of rules and central planning.  As policymakers and economists,  we 
often lapse into thinking about policy from the point of view of a central 
planner.  The Greek root of the word "economy,"  oikonomos,  means "household 
manager."  Many economists think that their job is to help the political 
leader "manage the household" of the economy given the set of rules inherited 
-.  from the past.  They tend to concentrate on  macro variables such as aggregate 
demand and total employment.  Their main concern becomes the manipulation of 
policy levers to engineer desired outcomes for these aggregates.  Herbert 
Stein (1989) compares managing the economy to flying a Boeing 747, implying 
that the economist's  role is like that of the navigator or pilot.  I  would 
rather think of the economist as the designer of aviation regulations and 
air-traffic  control systems.  In  my opinion,  we need economists to design the 
rules,  not to run the system. 
Several authors refer to hysteresis in unemployment and introduce the 
idea that temporary demand management policies may affect the unemployment 
level permanently, or at least for a very long time.  Indeed, one is as likely 
to find persistent low (or high) growth across different sectors in a given 
economy as in similar sectors of different countries.  The important point 
here is that national policies do seem to affect an  economy's growth rate. 
Macroeconomists concerned with hysteresis in unemployment tend to attribute 
the idiosyncratic aspects of a nation's economy to aggregate demand 
management. 
Neither the theory nor the empirical evidence is sufficient to justify 
modifying policies based on these ideas about hysteresis in  unemployment. 
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to overwhelm an abundance of contrary evidence.  Furthermore,  it is still not 
fully understood to what extent the persistence of unemployment can be 
attributed to institutions affecting the labor market.  We know that generous 
unemployment compensation,  plant-closing  laws,  and widespread unionization, 
for example, can explain some of this experience.  Economists can  build 
particular models in  which temporary policies can generate permanent effects, 
but these models have little generality. 
Consider another explanation for persistent low growth and high 
unemployment.  Today, the standard of living in free-market  economies is much 
higher than it is in countries that have been under central planning.  The 
rules matter:  Countries with inefficient rules have lower real growth rates. 
These rules usually take the form of an improper mix of tax laws, entry 
regulations, subsidies to business,  weak antitrust laws,  tariffs,  and erratic 
inflation policies, to cite a few examples.  There are good economic 
explanations for why these factors affect real growth and living standards 
in a country.  If  monetary policy influences the real growth rate and the 
persistence of high unemployment rates, it probably does so through the 
microeconomic channels discussed by Peter Howitt in chapter 3 of Lipsey 
(1990),  not through macroeconomic channels.  If so,  inflation and uncertainty 
about the price level inhibit,  not stimulate,  real growth.  Empirical evidence 
for this can be found in the multi-country  studies of real growth by Kormendi 
and Meguire (1985),  Grier and Tullock (1989),  and Barro (1989).  They have 
found that higher inflation or uncertain inflation tends to reduce output 
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Although particular monetary policy actions within a given set of rules 
may be neutral, output growth and the standard of living can, in principle,  be 
affected by the particular rules adopted.  Under current monetary rules in 
the United States and Canada,  the inflation rate is allowed to vary in 
response to both real shocks and political pressures.  This variability 
introduces an uncertainty about future inflation that is likely to reduce 
economic efficiency and the real growth rate in the same way that inefficient 
economic rules lower living standards.  The central banker's  flexibility to 
choose the inflation rate also is an  opportunity to tax currency and nominal 
bonds and to redistribute  wealth.  There is no reason to think that the 
central banker can make these decisions any more effectively than the central 
planner can run the economy. 
Zero inflation policies are not meant to upset the established monetary 
system;  rather,  they are intended to limit discretion.  Consider an analogy 
with the legal system.  A legal system is a combination of rules and 
discretion.  It includes judges who must face new and unprecedented cases. 
Such cases might be rare,  but they require experience and sound judgment.  In 
theory, good judgment survives a review process and becomes part of the law. 
Likewise, experienced central bankers are expected to make judgments in new 
and unprecedented cases.  These judgments also go through an informal review 
process.  But to prevent the system from sliding into one of arbitrary 
authority and central planning, the central bank's  actions must be constrained 
by rules. 
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The biggest problem monetary policymakers face in achieving price 
stability is their apparent inability to commit to long-term  goals.  This lack 
of commitment results, in my opinion,  from the fact that most policymakers and 
many economists do not really believe that commitment to an explicit objective 
would be optimal.  Economists typically cite our ignorance about all of the 
contingencies that might arise as an argument against monetary policy rules. 
In  our 1989 manuscript, "A  Flexible Monetary-Policy  Rule for Zero 
Inflation,"  Alan C. Stockman and I offer an explicit yet flexible rule for 
reaching and maintaining zero inflation.  We consider a situation in which the 
central bank is legally required to adopt an explicit target path for the CPI 
level extending into the indefinite future.  We then define a narrow band 
extending above and below the target path within which the price level may 
fluctuate (see figure 1).  The primary objective of the central bank would be 
to keep the CPI within this band. 
The band should be wide enough so that the central bank could use a 
variety of procedures to keep the index within it.  The Swedish Riksbank used 
a combination of discount-rate  changes, gold purchases and sales,  and foreign 
currency operations to keep the CPI near 100.  The Swedish experience is shown 
in figure 2 (our proposed band is imposed on the historical data). 8 
A  band of 6  percent--an  area 3  percent above and 3  percent below the 
level of the target--should  be sufficient for either the U.S. or Canadian 
economies.  The CPI is unlikely to move outside of it unless the central bank 
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outside of the band, actions taken to bring it back in should be explainable 
by monetary authorities and obvious to citizens. 
We do not recommend an immediate change to a zero inflation  policy. 
Rather,  we would go slowly,  beginning with the actual CPI for the previous 
year and letting the target path rise by the expected inflation rate in the 
current year (in our illustration,  the path was allowed to rise by 5 percent 
in 1990).  Then  we would reduce the growth rate of the target path by 1/2 
percent each year until the target inflation rate was zero.  To improve 
communication about the target and the policy stance,  the index would be 
normalized to 100  when inflation in the target path was zero. 
One could choose a faster path for disinflation.  Most advocates of zero 
inflation  policies recommend achieving zero within five years.  Their 
reasoning is simply that gradual policies may not be credible.  The noise in 
the CPI,  those unavoidable and unexpected changes associated with real shocks, 
may be large relative to the incremental changes that would accompany a 
gradual deceleration.  Witness the Canadian experience.  The Bank of Canada 
claims to be on a path toward zero inflation.  Yet, in 1989,  inflation rose 
'above  5  percent after having been on a trend of 4  percent for several years. 
If the policy is stated in terms of inflation and not price level,  then the 
target-path  reductions must be large relative to noise in the index. 
We think it is essential for credibility to target the price level.  Even 
if analysis showed that,  for economic reasons,  one would prefer short-run 
inflation targets in  which past errors were ignored,  we believe that political 
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incentive for debtors to lobby for ease while creditors lobby for restraint. 
Random shocks to the economy would cause the price level to rise or fall from 
one period to the next.  The public could never be sure whether a given 
deviation from target was due to an exogenous shock or the result of 
capitulation to political pressures.  If the target is stated in levels,  this 
ignorance would be immaterial. 
We also think that setting a price level target is important  because it 
represents an anchor--a  benchmark that the public could use to monitor central 
bank behavior.  The central bank could begin to build credibility during the 
first  year of the transition, even before it begins to lower the inflation 
rate.  People merely would need to watch how the bank responds to deviations 
of the price level from target,  and listen to how it explains its actions to 
the government. 
Setting the goal in terms of a multi-year  path for the price level 
eliminates the most important objection to a gradual disinflation  policy; that 
is, the objection that gradual declines in the inflation goal are not credible 
because they are small relative to noise in the index.  Eliminating this 
objection is important because there are some advantages to going slowly. 
First,  a slow transition does not necessarily require any change in the 
short-term  policy stance.  This is consistent with our emphasis on taking a 
long view.  Second,  any abrupt change in economic policy is likely to cause an 
arbitrary redistribution  of  wealth; a gradual transition  would reduce the size 
of this redistribution.  Third,  any change in  policy carries some risk of 
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might induce a recession,  whereas the very gradual deceleration that we 
propose reduces the chance of an associated recession. 
The proposed policy would not prevent short-term  movements of the price 
level;  we do not intend it to.  But it would prevent long-run  inflation, 
while long-term  interest rates would fall.  The rate on perpetual bonds in 
Sweden during the 1930s fluctuated between 3 and 4  percent throughout the 
period of zero inflation.  If the central bank, in alliance with other parts 
of government,  were to commit to this type of rule,  we think that long-term 
rates would fall almost immediately. 
Our proposed zero inflation policy need not change the daily operations 
of the Bank of Canada or strategy agreed upon at policy meetings.  Indeed, 
this rule would have no visible effect on central bank activities if the CPI 
stayed within the proposed band. 
Additionally, the central bank would not be prevented from conducting 
effective countercyclical policy.  More likely, its ability to conduct such 
policy would be enhanced.  Currently,  the public cannot distinguish between a 
countercyclical policy and a changed inflation goal.  Public skepticism limits 
the ability to conduct the former. 
Our rule would not prevent the Bank of Canada from acting as the lender 
of last resort or responding appropriately to financial crises.  As long as 
the CPI remained within the band, no new constraints on policy would be 
effected.  In  an emergency,  the central bank could increase the money supply 
by any amount.  It should be noted that an inflating economy is a crisis-prone 
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savings and loan industry in the 1980s would not have occurred if it were not 
for the inflation of the 1970s. 
Stockman and I  include a somewhat complicated rule for the monetary base 
that would apply in those instances when the CPI moves outside of the band. 
In order to enforce the rules,  others have recommended tying the central 
bankers' compensation or tenure to the success of the zero inflation  policy. 
I do not think that such devices are necessary:  If the government committed 
to a goal of price stability,  no other incentive would be required for 
success. 
VI  .  Conclus  ion 
In  what kind of a world shall we live?  Market economies and monetary 
systems are institutions built by people.  These institutions can serve our 
interests or they can be allowed to run  amok.  If we want to live in a world 
in  which we understand monetary policy and the circumstances in  which it is 
likely to be changed,  then we need to set a standard that can  be easily 
monitored.  A zero inflation policy, expressed as a price level target,  would 
provide such a standard. 
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1.  See Pierre Fortin, "Do We Measure Inflation Correctly?" in Lipsey 
(1990). 
2.  Fisher (1934) describes proposals made by John Rooke in 1824,  G. Paulett 
Scrope in 1833,  G.R. Porter in 1843,  W. Stanley Jevons in 1876,  Robert Giffen 
in 1879,  J. Barr Robertson in 1877,  Simon Newcomb in 1879,  Carlton H. Mills in 
1879,  Leon Walras in 1885,  Alexander Del Mar in 1885,  Alfred Marshall in 1887, 
F.Y. Edgeworth in 1889,  Theodor Lawes in 1890,  Silvio Gesell in 1891,  Aneurin 
Williams in 1892,  Robert Zuckerkandl in 1893,  O.J. Frost in 1893,  Arthur I. 
Fonda in 1895,  Henry Winn in 1895,  Arthur Kitson in 1895,  George H. Shibley in 
1896,  J. Allen Smith in 1896,  William A. Whittick in 1896,  Dana J. Tinnes in 
1896,  Ektweed Pomeroy in 1897,  Alfred Russel Wallace in 1898,  Knut Wicksell 
in 1898,  and Worthy B. Stern in 1898. 
3.  See Jonung (1979) and Fisher (1934) for descriptions of this monetary 
experiment. 
4.  See Gavin and Sniderman (1988) for a discussion of recent developments in 
macroeconomics. 
5.  See Peter Howitt, "Zero Inflation as a Long-term  Target for Monetary 
Policy,"  in Lipsey (1990). 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm6.  See Douglas D. Purvis, "The Bank of Canada and the Pursuit of Price 
Stability,"  in Lipsey (1990). 
7.  In  the United States,  Congress is currently debating House Joint 
Resolution 409,  which would make price stability the overriding goal of 
monetary policy.  In  West Germany, the Bundesbank operates under a legislated 
mandate to pursue price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy.  See 
Willms (1983),  page 36. 
8.  The Riksbank chose to abandon its zero inflation policy in early 1937 so 
that it could fix its currency on an inflating British pound.  Inflation then 
accelerated rapidly with the start of World War 11. 
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